




**Director of
Central
Intelligence**

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National Intelligence Daily

***Monday
21 June 1982***

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
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Luis Alberto Monge—age 56—former labor organizer—cofounder of the social democratic National Liberation Party—ardent anti-Communist, looks to US for assistance in preserving Costa Rica's democratic tradition—reputation as honest, adroit administrator—married twice.



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③ COSTA RICA - US: President Monge's Visit

1 *President Monge arrives in Washington today seeking support for the tough economic and security policies that have distinguished his first six weeks in office.* []

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Monge recognizes Costa Rica's near bankruptcy as the major threat to social tranquillity. He has increased utility rates and instituted other austerity measures to curb government spending and secure a loan from the IMF. Nevertheless, his administration's penchant for compromise politics recently resulted in a lowering of interest rates on agricultural loans, despite triple-digit inflation and protests from the IMF. []

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The President has been more consistent on political issues, particularly in moving to counter possible domestic and foreign security threats. Monge recently announced creation of a special antiterrorism squad and is seeking materiel and training assistance from abroad. He has refused to exclude US military aid. []

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Monge holds Cuba and the USSR responsible for instability in Central America and has ruled out relations with Havana and threatened to expel the Soviets if terrorism resumes in Costa Rica. He sees the most immediate external threat coming from Managua, whose concern over anti-Sandinista guerrillas in the border area is behind increasing incursions by the Nicaraguan Army. He also is worried about reports of Nicaraguan subversive activity in Costa Rica, including allegations of the presence of armed squatters in the border area. []

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Comment: Despite Monge's austerity moves and the prospect of an IMF loan, complete economic recovery is years away. The President's need to compromise between the pragmatic elements of his party and those addicted to public spending will complicate decisions on economic policy. []

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Although Monge's predecessor refused to acknowledge publicly that the Sandinistas operate in Costa Rica, Monge appears determined to take action. He has threatened to ask the OAS for a peace force to protect the northern frontier. []

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⑤ IRAQ-IRAN: Unilateral Iraqi Withdrawal

President Saddam Hussein announced yesterday that Iraq would complete its withdrawal from all Iranian territory by 30 June.

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Comment: Saddam's statement is an implicit admission of his Army's inability to prevent the Iranians from eventually recovering all their territory by force. By withdrawing he satisfies one of Iran's principal demands, but Tehran is unlikely to agree to negotiations soon. Withdrawal to the prewar borders would make several small Iraqi towns vulnerable to Iranian shelling for the first time since the war's outbreak in September 1980. Should Tehran decide an invasion of Iraq is necessary to force Saddam's removal, Iran will have easier access to the shortest and most direct approaches to Baghdad.

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(10) USSR-BOTSWANA: Increasing Soviet Influence

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Comment: The Soviets are mainly interested in Botswana as a base to support subversive operations against South Africa. Pretoria carefully monitors the Soviet presence in Botswana and could use its economic leverage to persuade Botswana to maintain restrictions on Soviet activities.

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